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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the occurrence of increasing wage inequality along with rising volume 
of trade in developed countries has led to a debate about the impact of international trade on the 
changing wage structure. While economists argue about the quantitative impact of trade, they 
agree that trade can lead to higher income inequality in a high-income nation (the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem). On the other hand, conventional trade theory predicts that trade will lead to 
lower income inequality in developing countries. Unfortunately, that prediction has not been 
borne out. Studies of developing countries find that trade liberalization episodes have been 
accompanied by rising wage inequality. 
There are fewer studies of developing countries compared to the literature on developed 
countries. Robbins (1996) in a study of developing countries in Latin America, East and South-
East Asia finds that wage differentials have risen in many developing countries with high trade 
exposure. Using household data, he finds that trade liberalization has been accompanied by 
rising relative wages and demand for skilled-labor in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan and Uruguay, contradicting the predictions of 
traditional trade theory. Robbins suggests that adoption of skill intensive technology via capital 
goods imports is responsible for rising inequality and finds some evidence for this using data on 
aggregate machinery imports. 
Wood (1997) compares the experience of Latin America since the mid-1980s with that of 
East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. He points out that while the wage gap between skilled labor 
and unskilled labor narrowed in the four tigers (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore,   2
and Taiwan) in the initial decades of export-oriented industrialization, wage differentials have 
risen in many of Latin American countries following their trade liberalization episodes. He 
suggests that the difference in experience is due to the entry of China and other large developing 
countries into the world market and the introduction of skilled-biased technology since the 
1980s. Davis (1996) makes a similar argument and shows in a model with multiple 
diversification cones that local factor abundance, instead of global factor abundance, is central to 
determining the income distributional effects of trade liberalization. Also, Hanson and Harrison 
(1999) provide evidence suggesting that rising wage inequality in Mexico may have been due to 
import competition in low skill intensive industries. 
  There are other possible explanations for this phenomenon. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 
1997) hypothesize that activities transferred from the north to the south are more skilled-labor 
intensive than those formerly produced in the south, but less skilled-labor intensive than those in 
the north. They argue that capital flows from the north to the south increase the relative demand 
for skilled labor in both the north and the south. They find evidence for this using regional data 
for Mexico. 
One mechanism that has been relatively unexplored is the role of imported machinery 
and more generally of imported intermediate goods (with the exception of Robbins, discussed 
above). This is a bit odd since the bulk of world trade is in intermediate goods. One 
straightforward way in which imported machinery (or intermediate goods) could increase the 
skill premium in developing countries is if they embody a technology that is biased in favor of 
skilled labor. There is some evidence in favor of skill biased technological change in 
industrialized countries. Moreover, as Berman and Machin (2000) point out there is evidence for 
this in middle-income countries too. Using data on employment ratios they provide evidence for   3
a shift in favor of non-production workers. There has also been an increase in the wage bill share 
of non-production workers. Also, changes in the wage bill share of industries are correlated 
across countries indicating that skill biased technological change tends to take place in the same 
industries globally. 
However, imported intermediate inputs can affect the skill premium even if the skill bias 
of the technology does not change. For example, if only the skilled labor intensive sector has 
access to imported intermediate inputs and the imports of these increase after trade liberalization, 
then the skill premium could increase. The conventional predictions in trade theory regarding the 
effects of trade on the prices of different factors of production (e.g., skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
etc.) assumes a simple framework with only final goods and no impediments to trade. However, 
if production uses intermediate goods and all intermediate goods are not traded freely, then both 
the pattern of trade and the effect of trade on skilled and unskilled labor become difficult to 
predict. Deardorff (1979) made this point with the help of an example. In this case the effect of 
trade on the wages of skilled and unskilled workers may be contrary to what we expect from 
more conventional models. For more recent analyses of the case with intermediate goods trade 
see, for example, Deardorff (2001) and Jones (2000a). 
In this paper we present a simple framework for analyzing the effects of intermediate 
goods imports both when it leads to skilled biased technological change and when it does not. It 
is important to distinguish between these two scenarios because they have different implications 
for what happens to the real wage of unskilled labor. While the skill biased technology story 
implies that imports of intermediate goods could reduce real wages, the simple imported inputs 
story has the implication that real wages of unskilled labor would rise although not as much as   4
that of skilled labor. This has implications for how we view the inequality associated with 
globalization and how undesirable we think this trend in skill premium is. 
We take into account the fact that the majority of unskilled labor is not in manufacturing 
but in traditional non-tradeable sectors, which are in general more unskilled labor intensive. The 
bulk of unskilled labor in developing countries is employed in family farms (some in rural non 
farm) and the urban informal sector (see World Development Report 1995)
1. Rural employment 
is engaged mostly in food production either for subsistence or for sale in the domestic market. 
The bulk of urban informal employment falls in the category of the self employed, which 
includes mostly non-tradeable labor intensive activities (see World Employment Report 1998-
99)
2. Also, as one would expect, the average level of education is lower in the urban informal 
sector than in the formal sector
3. 
We assume a developing country with two sectors - a traditional sector (e.g., labor 
intensive services) that is unskilled labor intensive and a modern sector (e.g., manufacturing) that 
is skilled labor intensive. The traditional sector does not use any (tradeable) inputs. This is a 
reasonable assumption for labor-intensive activities in the urban informal sector. We also assume 
that the traditional good is not tradeable (based on the discussion in the previous paragraph). The 
modern sector uses inputs that embody technology. The developing country cannot produce the 
tradeable intermediate goods because of lack of technological know-how. 
                                                 
1 In poor countries, almost 83% of the labor force is in this sector; in middle-income countries, the corresponding 
proportion is about 50. 
2 These activities include domestic help, shoe shining and repair, street vending, rickshaw pulling (in some 
countries), haircutting, electronic repair services, meat preparation etc. In 1996, about 65% of the urban informal 
employment in Peru was in the self employed category (see ILO, World Employment Report 1998-99); about 86% 
of the self employed were ``own-account'' workers, i.e., persons engaged in a business but who did not hire any 
employees (see ILO, 1999). A relatively small fraction of the urban labor force (about 16%) was engaged in the 
informal “micro enterprises” that could potentially be producing tradeable goods. Urban informal employment was 
50% of total urban employment (the proportion for unskilled labor is likely to have been higher). 
3 Studies of the informal sector in Thailand, Paraguay and Tanzania show the concentration of poorly educated in 
this sector (see World Employment Report, 1998-99).   5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model in which 
intermediate imports lead to an increase in the skill premium without involving a skill biased 
technological change. It also explores the effects of a skill biased technological change within 
the same framework. The implications for the real wage under the two assumptions are also 
discussed. Section 3 describes developments in Peru in the 1990s and the trends in relative 
wages. Section 4 describes the data and the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider the following simple model. Assume there are two final goods - a traded good 
X (the modern industry) and a non-traded good Y (the traditional industry) and a traded 
intermediate good T (traded). All of T is imported in the developing country. The assumption 
here is that the developing country lacks the factor to produce the intermediate goods. There are 
two primary factors of production - S (skilled labor) and L (unskilled labor). We will assume that 
these factors are also exogenously given. We assume that X is the skilled labor intensive good 
and Y is the unskilled labor intensive good. Unskilled labor is mobile between the two sectors. 
We will assume that there are trade barriers on the import of the intermediate good and a 
movement towards free trade will increase these imports
4. Let the production functions be of the 
following form:  
1
xx XATSL
abab -- =  
and 
yy YAL =  
where Lx and Ly are the labor employed in the X and Y industry, respectively. 
                                                 
4 In the real world a rationale for these barriers could be balance of payments concerns.   6
We assume that utility is homothetic with share g spent on Y and the rest spent on X. We 
will assume that g’(px/py)>0. Using the fact that production has to equal consumption in the non-













          (1) 














        (2) 
Using the fact that the marginal revenue product of unskilled labor in the two sectors will equal 
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Equations (3) and (2) imply a positive and negative relationship between Lx and px/py, 
respectively (shown in figure 1). 
   
Intermediate imports without skill biased technological change 
An increase in T shifts the curve (implied by (3)) downwards leading to a decrease in 
px/py and an increase in Lx as shown in figure 1. This leads to an increase in wS/wL as is obvious 
                                                 








= . The difference comes from the 
fact that in the developing country only (1-a)pxX  accrues as income to factors in the X industry. The rest is used to 
pay for the imports of the traded intermediate good that is obtained from the developed nation.   7
from equation (4). However, since wL=Aypy, a decrease in px/py will mean an increase in wL/px, 
that is, an increase in the real wage in terms of the X good. 
Note that intermediate imports behave like sector biased technological change
6. It leads 
to an increase in the relative wages of the factor that is employed more intensively in the sector 
that experiences the technological improvement. 
It can be shown that trade liberalization in this scenario will lead to a rise in the relative 
income of skilled workers in the (small) developed nation also (see Appendix A.1). That is, 
increased trade leads to higher inequality in both countries. 
 
Intermediate imports with skill biased technological change 
  We can also analyze the effects of skill biased technological change within the same 
framework. We will assume that this new technology is embodied in imported inputs so that this 
change takes place only in the X sector. In order to contrast the effects of skill biased 
technological change from simple input imports of the previous sub-section, we will keep the 
quantity of input imports constant (i.e., T stays the same). In reality, and as we will assume for 
the empirical section, skill biased change is likely to be accompanied by increase in intermediate 
goods imports. 
A skill biased technological change is said to have occurred if at the same relative wage 
the ratio of unskilled labor to skilled labor decreases. This implies that b will have to increase 
(see equation (4)). Also, there should be a reduction in cost at initial factor prices. The reduction 
in costs in the X industry at initial factor prices is given by  ˆˆˆ
TXTXSXSXLXLX bbb qqq ++where q 
                                                 
6 Jones (2000b) provides a lucid analysis of the effects of the sector biased and skill biased technical change in a 
general model with only traded goods. The analysis does not, however, incorporate intermediate goods imports or 
discuss explicitly the effects on the real wage. See also Xu (2001).   8
denotes factor share and  ˆ b denotes the relative reduction in unit factor requirements at initial 
factor prices (see Jones 2000). This can be shown to equal  ˆ log(/) x LS bb - . This expression has 
to be positive implying a cost reduction (that is, Lx/S has to be less than 1). 
The effects of skill biased technological change are shown in figure 2. As is clear from 
equation (2), the AA curve shifts to the left. The BB curve could shift either way. If the BB curve 
shifts to the right then px/py falls and we get the same effects on the real wage of unskilled labor 
as in the previous section. However, it is also possible for the BB curve to shift to the left. If the 
shift in BB to the left is large enough then px/py will rise and the real wage of unskilled labor will 
fall. This will occur when the horizontal shift of the BB curve is greater in magnitude than the 
horizontal shift in AA (the positively sloped line in figure 2 between BB and B’B’ shows the 
position of BB if the horizontal shift was the same as in AA - in this case px/py would stay 
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A sufficient condition for the inequality to hold is if –log (Lx/S) <1. Since changes in the 
value of Ay, Ax and T change the equilibrium value of Lx (at the same level of S), px/py will rise 
for values of these three parameters that lead to values of -log (Lx/S) <1. A greater horizontal 
shift in BB leads to a rise in px/py and a fall in Lx. 
The inequality (5) can also be derived using the Jones (1965) methodology. It can be 
shown using the Jones framework that px/py will increase (or  ˆˆ0 xy pp -> , where the ^ denotes 
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and sijX denotes the elasticity of substitution between factors i and j in sector X. 
PS and PL have the same interpretation as in Jones - they are measures of overall factor 
(S and L, respectively, in this model) saving features of technological change. PX is a measure of 
the technological change in the X industry (same as Jones). The inequality above is not exactly 
analogous to the corresponding expression in Jones because of the presence of three factors and 
other special features of this model. The condition above is more likely to hold if the technology 
is more unskilled labor saving than skilled labor saving and if the overall technological 
improvement (or cost saving at initial factor prices) in the X industry is small. It can be shown 
that the condition (6) will hold if the inequality (5) is satisfied. 
It can be shown that an increase in px/py will also lead to an increase in the skill premium 
or wS/wL (see appendix A.3). Also, a rise in px/py will lead to a fall in the real wages of unskilled   10
labor in terms of the X good (since wL=Aypy). Therefore, the implications of skill-biased change 
for the welfare of unskilled labor are different from the simple intermediate goods imports story 
described in the previous subsection. While the latter story implies that unskilled labor suffers a 
wage decline in relative terms but an improvement in absolute terms, the skilled biased story 
could imply a wage decline in both absolute and relative terms. Other empirical implications are 
also different. Skill biased technological change should be accompanied by a decrease in the 
ratio of unskilled to skilled workers while the simple intermediate goods story would imply an 
increase in this ratio. Also, the former implies that unskilled labor share of the wage bill should 
decrease while the latter story implies no changes in wage shares. We will use these implications 
to distinguish the two hypotheses. 
 
3. The Peruvian Experience 
Peru was a relatively open economy in the 1950s and 1960s with exports mostly 
consisting of primary goods. It experienced more or less steady growth from 1950s to mid 1970s. 
It implemented import substitution policies in the 1970s. From the mid 1970s onwards there was 
a steady decline in per capita GDP so that per capita GDP in 1990 was no higher than in 1960. It 
suffered the debt crisis in the 80s and hyperinflation between 1988 and 1990. 
Fujimori came to power in 1990 and implemented wide-ranging structural reforms 
including trade liberalization. His government eliminated price controls, subsidies, and foreign 
exchange restrictions. A flexible exchange rate was adopted in August 1990, and foreign 
exchange surrender requirements and foreign currency restrictions were abandoned in March 
1991. At the same time, the average level of tariffs was reduced sharply, from 66 percent in 1989 
to 15 percent in 1995 and 12 percent in 1997. Tariff reform in September of 1990 led to three   11
tariff rates – 15 percent on inputs without domestic substitutes (e.g., basic steel industry capital 
goods for industry, metal-mechanic, medical equipment, some medicines, parts for vehicles and 
tires); 25 percent for the rest of the capital goods and inputs with domestic protection and also 
for agricultural goods intended for final consumption and 50 percent for the rest of the 
consumption goods, inputs and capital goods (these included goods which previously enjoyed 
tariff rates greater than 50 percent). Import prohibitions, which were extensively used in the 
1970s and the late 1980s, were gradually abandoned. The only import prohibitions that remained 
were for public health and security. Export restrictions were eliminated for most exports in 1991. 
After a recession in 1992, the country experienced GDP annual growth rates of more than 
7 percent in the following five years. Inflation was much lower (average annual rate of around 20 
percent) in the following five years. Both imports and exports showed dramatic increases after 
the liberalization. Intermediate goods imports also rose sharply (see figure 3). 
  There were other important changes associated with the stabilization program that are 
relevant for our study. Fujimori introduced dramatic changes in labor legislation and passed a 
labor law in 1995 that abolished the right to job security and also reduced severance payments 
that had to be paid to a worker upon dismissal. Also, there was a substantial privatization drive in 
the 1990s especially in 1995 and 1996. Most of the privatizations were in mining, fishing, 
banking and utilities (electricity and telecommunications). 
  The trends in relative wages are shown in table 1 and figure 4. Salaries and wages in 
figure 4 are the payments to white and blue-collar workers respectively. Table 1 reports the 
average annual wages in real terms of different categories of workers in 1991, 1994 and 1997 
that have been computed using the labor survey described below. The increase in executive   12
salaries was around an average of 22 percent per year while that of white-collar and blue-collar 
workers was around 8 and –4 percent, respectively, on average per year during this period. 
4. Data and Estimation 
  We use data from the Labor Survey in Metropolitan Lima by the Labor Ministry in Peru. 
Lima accounts for 85 percent of the industrial sector in Peru and the Labor Survey covers all 
formal firms in Metropolitan Lima. In this sense, the sample is quite representative of Peru. The 
Labor Ministry conducts the Labor Survey 4-5 times each year. All formal firms in metropolitan 
Lima are required to respond and turn in reports about their total employment and payroll. We 
have used the surveys for 1991, 1994 and 1997. 
  The survey reports wage and employment information for the three categories of workers 
- executives (ejecutivos), white collar (empleados) and blue collar (obreros). Since the total 
working hours and extra (overtime) working hours are recorded for blue collar employees, the 
hourly wage is computed as the total payment divided by the sum of total working hours and 
extra working hours. The monthly wage is obtained by multiplying the average hourly wage by 
192 (assuming a 48 hour work week). For white-collar employees and executives, the monthly 
wages are simply the total payments to the two categories of workers divided by the total number 
of employees respectively. The annual wages are obtained by multiplying the monthly wages by 
12. We will interpret the executive to blue-collar wage ratio and white to blue-collar wage ratio 
as the ratio of wages of skilled workers to unskilled workers. 
  One can get a few clues regarding what is happening if one looks at the data on the two 
broad sectors - manufacturing and services. There was a sharp decrease in the share of 
manufacturing in blue-collar employment in Peru between 1991 and 1997, as we show in table 
2A.The shares of manufacturing in white collar and executives employment do not exhibit any   13
definite trend. The fall in share of manufacturing in blue-collar employment did not occur 
because of a decrease in the overall importance of the manufacturing sector in the economy. We 
can see from this table its share in the total wage bill or its share in GDP (first two rows of 
numbers) did not change much. Since the share of blue-collar employment in manufacturing fell 
without a significant decrease in the share of manufacturing in total wage bill, we would expect 
the blue-collar share in the wage bill to fall in manufacturing. In fact, that is what we observe 
(see second row of table 2B). The blue-collar share in the wage bill in this sector shows a 
substantial decline of 18 percentage points between 1991 and 1997. We would also expect the 
ratio of blue-collar employment to white collar and executive employment to fall in 
manufacturing. This ratio declines substantially (34 percent) as one can see from the same table. 
  The blue-collar share in the wage bill in the service sector, on the other hand does not 
show much change (there is a small decrease). The ratio of blue to white-collar employment 
shows a substantial rise of more than 100 percent in the service sector during the same period. 
This suggests that the service sector is absorbing the excess unskilled labor displaced from the 
manufacturing sector. A rise in blue-collar employment with a small decrease in their wage share 
would suggest that the average wages of blue collar in the service sector should fall or (at least 
not rise too much). That is what we observe. Blue-collar wages in the service sector actually 
show a decline in real terms of 52 percent, during this period. The picture that emerges from this 
table is the following. Although manufacturing did not lose its importance during this period, 
there was a biased shift in favor of skilled labor, perhaps due to technological change. The excess 
supply of unskilled labor created by this shift was absorbed in the service sector, depressing 
wages in this sector.   14
  We now explore changes at the industry level. We use the data from 1994-1997 in order 
to do this. This is because there was a change in the industry classification system in 1991, which 
makes it difficult to compare data from 1991 with the other years. The classification for 1994 
and 1997 is the same and corresponds to ISIC (Revision 3). We will use the data from 1994 and 
1997 only for all subsequent analysis as well as the regressions. We believe that the study of the 
1994-1997 period would still shed light on the processes that started in 1991 as a result of 
liberalization. This is because the trends in blue collar employment in manufacturing and the 
blue collar wage share in this sector that started in 1991continued during the 1994-1997 period, 
as is clear from tables 2A and 2B.  
   Since it is the manufacturing sector that has experienced a big drop in blue-collar share, 
we focus our attention on industries in this sector only for all subsequent analysis
7. Some of the 
highest growth rates in white collar and executive wages during the 1994-1997 period were to be 
found in the manufacturing industries. In fact, real executive wages increased at a faster rate in 
the manufacturing sector compared to the services sector. The industries that show very high 
white-collar wage growth rates are ISIC 1513 (processing of fruits and vegetables), 2422 (paints, 
varnishes. coatings, printing ink), 2694 (cement, lime and plaster), 2922 (machine tools), and 
5239 (other retail sale in specialized stores). Some of the same industries like 2422, 2694, and 
2922 also show large growth in executive wages. 
  Industries at the input-output (IO) category level that have experienced large changes in 
the blue-collar wage share (greater than 5 percentage points) in the manufacturing sector are 
shown in table 3. The top half includes industries that have experienced increases in the share 
                                                 
7 We included electrical power and water and construction in our sample although they may not be considered 
strictly manufacturing because these sectors are likely to use blue-collar workers intensively. All mining sectors 
were excluded because workers in these sectors who work in Lima are unlikely to be representative of the mining 
industry as a whole.   15
such as textiles and footwear, which are unskilled labor-intensive industries. As is clear from the 
table, the largest decreases in the blue-collar wage share have occurred in the less unskilled 
labor-intensive industries like paper and paper products, pharmaceuticals and machinery 
industries. The correlation between changes in the blue-collar wage share over this period and 
the initial (i.e., 1994) white to blue employment ratio is –0.51 suggesting that skill biased 
technological change (as measured by changes in the blue collar share) occurred in the more skill 
intensive industries. This is interesting and contrary to what we would expect if we thought that 
competition from very low-income countries in Asia in labor-intensive industries was behind the 
decreasing blue-collar relative wage in Latin America. In fact, the garment industry, which is 
perhaps most likely to face competition from cheap Asian labor (and accounted for 7 percent of 
the blue collar work force in the sample), experienced an increase in its blue-collar employment 
of about 15 percent in the 1994-97 period.   
The decrease in real wages of unskilled workers, the drop in their share in the wage bill in 
manufacturing and the decline in the blue to white employment ratio provides evidence for skill 
biased technological change, according to our theory. Machinery imports are most likely to be 
the driving force behind such change since they are likely to embody new technology. If the 
skilled biased technological change were taking place via machinery imports then we would 
expect changes in the blue-collar wage share and white to blue employment ratio to be correlated 
with machinery imports at the industry level. We explore this relationship further using data on 
machinery imports. The data on imported machinery by industry was not available for Peru for 
all years. It was available for 1994 at the IO level industries from Peru's 1994 input-output table. 
We used this data to form estimates for 1997 using trade data available from the UN 
International Trade Statistics by assuming that the share of industry i's imports of machinery in   16
total machinery imports stays constant over time. We also form estimates of total intermediate 
good usage for 1997 by assuming that the use of any good in any industry increases in the same 
proportion as the value added in that industry. The data for value added by industry comes from 
the Compendio Estadistico published by INEI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Informatica). 
  We focus our analysis on three variables - the blue-collar wage share, the ratio of white-
collar employment to blue-collar employment and the ratio of white-collar wages to blue-collar 
wages. Table 4 gives a few correlations at the IO industry level. It gives the correlations of 
changes in these variables with changes in the share of imported machinery in total intermediate 
goods usage. Two thirds of total machinery imports went to the manufacturing sector in 1994. 
Blue-collar wage share is negatively correlated with imported machinery while the white-collar 
to blue-collar employment ratio is positively correlated. The positive correlation suggests that 
skill-biased technological change is at work here. The decrease of the real wage of unskilled 
workers (shown in table 1) is also consistent with this hypothesis. The changes in the wage ratio 
are very weakly correlated with changes in the share of imported machinery. This may be due to 
labor mobility across industries that would tend to dampen wage differences across industries for 
the same category of workers.   
We use panel regression with fixed effects to test the relationship of our key labor 
variables with our trade variables. Specially, we regress our three variables of interest, the blue 
collar wage share, white to blue employment ratio and the white to blue collar wage ratio on the 
share of imported machinery in total intermediate goods. The control variables in the regression 
attempt to capture the effect of other variables that may affect the blue-collar wage share (and the 
other dependent variables of interest). These include unionization variables for blue- and white- 
collar workers, export and import share, investment and privatization.    17
The unionization variable is the proportion of firms in an industry that have some 
collective bargaining arrangement. This data comes from the labor survey. The export and 
import shares are the ratios of exports and imports of the good produced by an industry to total 
value added of that industry. Import penetration can potentially have an effect on the premium if 
there is competition from countries with lower wages and larger pools of unskilled labor (see, for 
example, Hanson and Harrison 1999). Skill premium may also be related to exports. Bernard and 
Jensen (1997) provide some evidence for this.  
We follow studies of the skill premium in industrialized nations (see, for example, 
Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Machin and Reenen (1998) and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-
Rull and Violante (2000)) and try to control for capital skill complementarities in our 
regressions. The investment share in total intermediate goods at the industry level is used to 
capture this effect. Since we do not have data on investment by industry we have to rely on 
estimates. We have data on total machinery investment for the economy as a whole for our 
sample period from the Compendio Estadistico. We assume that the proportion of total 
machinery investment in any year that is allocated to an industry is the same as the share of 
machinery used by that industry in total machinery used at the intermediate stage in 1994 (this 
data is obtained from the input-output table of 1994). The investment share is this estimated 
amount of investment in an industry divided by total value of intermediate goods used by that 
industry
8. 
 We use two measures of imported machinery in our regression. One is the share of 
imported machinery in total intermediate goods. The second measure is the share of imported 
machinery in total machinery investment in that industry (the latter is estimated as mentioned 
above). The privatization variable is total sales since 1991 divided by the value added in that   18
industry. This data also comes from the Compendio Estadistico. This variable is included to 
capture wage cuts and layoffs, especially of blue-collar workers, that may accompany 
privatization. Data on the imported machinery share, investment share and the privatization share 
are at the level of IO industries.  
Table 5 gives the mean values of the variables to be used in our regression. Note the 
decrease in the blue-collar wage share and the increase in the ratio of white- to blue-collar wages 
and dramatic rise in executive to blue-collar wages between 1994 and 1997. Also note the steep 
fall in the ratio of firms with unions (both white and blue collar) during this period. The high 
mean values of import and export shares are being driven by a few industries. The large values in 
the case of the imports are due to high level of imports compared to domestic value added (this is 
true for more sophisticated goods). In the case of exports the high values in some industries arise 
due to the fact that export is a gross concept and includes the value of intermediate goods 
(produced by other industries) used in the production of value added in an industry.  
  Table 6 reports the results of the regressions. The top row shows the dependent variables 
in each regression while the first column shows the independent variables. As we can see from 
the first and second regressions, the share of imported machinery in total intermediate usage has 
a negative and statistically significant effect on the blue-collar wage share. The point estimate is 
also very high. It implies that a 1-percentage point increase in the share of imported machinery 
will decrease the blue-collar wage share by more than 7 and 10 percentage points respectively. 
This would imply that the increase in the share of imported machinery could explain the entire 
decrease in the blue-collar wage share over this period. The other variables in the regression are 
not significant. The blue-collar unionization rate has a positive effect; the white-collar 
unionization rate has a negative effect. The coefficient for privatization is positive but not 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The results did not change much when we used investment as a fraction of value added.   19
significant. The investment share is positively related to the blue collar wage share implying that 
there are no capital skill complementarities and that unskilled workers actually gain relatively 
more from capital accumulation. This is different from the results of studies for developed 
countries where capital intensity is correlated with the share of skilled workers. This suggests 
that a different process may be at work in developing countries. Capital accumulation in these 
countries may be geared towards utilizing the more abundant factor - unskilled labor. The second 
regression introduces export and import shares. The imported machinery variable continues to be 
significant. 
  The third and fourth regressions use the share of imported machinery in investment as the 
independent variable. The investment share itself is a control in the regression. Therefore, this 
regression tests whether the composition of investment (imported machinery vs. domestic 
machinery) has an effect on the blue-collar wage share controlling for the investment share itself. 
This imported machinery variable again turns out have a negative coefficient. That is, a higher 
proportion of imported machinery in total investment does seem to reduce the blue-collar wage 
share.  However, the coefficient is not significant when export and import shares are present (the 
fourth regression), although it has the correct sign. 
  Regressions 5 through 8 have the white-collar to blue-collar employment ratio as the 
dependent variable. If there were indeed a skill-biased technological change, we would expect 
this ratio to be positively related to imported machinery. As is clear from regressions 5 and 6, the 
share of imported machinery in total intermediate goods usage is positively and significantly 
related to the white to blue-collar employment ratio. Note that white-collar unionization has a 
negative effect on white-collar employment ratio in all these regressions. This could imply that 
unionization tends to reduce employment for white-collar workers. In regression 5, investment   20
share is significant and negative supporting the idea that there are no capital skill 
complementarities and that unskilled workers actually gain relatively more from capital 
accumulation. Regressions 7 and 8 have the composition of investment as the independent 
variable. Again, the share of imported machinery in investment is positively related the white to 
blue employment ratio and the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. This variable is not 
significant when import and export shares are included.  
The third dependent variable of interest is the white-collar to blue-collar wage ratio. The 
last two regressions in table 6 report the results of the regressions with the white-collar to blue-
collar wage ratio as the dependent variable and the share of imported machinery in intermediate 
goods as the independent variable. The coefficient for the imported machinery variables is not 
significant in these regressions. We also ran the regressions (not reported) with the share of 
imported machinery in total machinery investment as the independent variable. The coefficient 
was not significant. The coefficients of the imported machinery variables are not significant in 
these regressions perhaps because inter industry labor mobility is dampening wage differentials 
across industries.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  We present a model of a developing country in which the traditional sector is unskilled 
labor intensive and the modern sector is skilled labor intensive and also has access to imported 
intermediate goods that embody technological knowledge. The skill premium can rise either 
because imports of inputs in the skilled labor intensive sector increase or if imported inputs lead 
to skill-biased technological change. We test some of the implications of our theory using data 
from Peru and find that machinery imports are related to declining blue-collar wage shares and   21
the decreasing ratio of blue collar to white collar employment. This provides support for the 
claim that skill biased technological change has taken place in Peru. The implication of this is 
that rising inequality has been accompanied by declining real wages for unskilled workers. In 
fact this is what we observe since the growth in wages of unskilled workers has not kept up with 
inflation. What is also interesting is that the skill-biased change seems to have taken place in 
industries that are less intensive in unskilled labor. This runs counter to the claim that such 
change in Latin America has been due to low wage competition from poorer Asian nations in 
unskilled labor-intensive industries.   22
APPENDIX 
 
A.1 The Effects of Trade in a Small Developed Country 
The effect of a movement from autarky to free trade for a small-developed nation will 
imply a rise in pt/px. The developed country will have endowments of the factor that can produce 
the traded intermediate good. Let us assume that one unit of this factor produces one unit of the 
intermediate good and gets paid wt (= pt). 
  A decrease in T will lead to a rise in px/py and a fall in Lx, i.e., labor employed in the X 
industry (using the logic of the previous section). This will lead to a rise in wt/wL and a fall in 
ws/wL (since Lx falls, equations (3) and (4) imply that Lx/S has to fall and Lx/T has to rise). In 
order to look at income distribution between the different groups we will assume that the factor 
required to produce the traded intermediate good is also skilled labor (of a different kind from S). 
The relative income between skilled labor and unskilled labor is therefore (wsS+wtT)/wLL, where 
T is the total endowment of the second skilled labor. Taking logs of this expression and totally 
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where  ˆ / jjj wdww =  
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Using the profit maximizing conditions of the firm we get,   23
  ˆˆˆˆˆˆ ()() xLsLtL pwwwww ba -=-+-   (9) 
  We know  ˆˆ xL pw -  is positive as a result of trade liberalization. Therefore, the right hand 
side of the inequality (8) is positive. 
That is, the income of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor increases as a result of 
trade. 
A.2 To derive the conditions under which the horizontal shift in BB is larger in 
magnitude than horizontal shift in AA 
  The horizontal shift in AA is the change in Lx keeping px/py constant using equation (2). 

















  (10) 
Similarly, taking logs and differentiating equation (3), assuming px/py constant to get the 
horizontal shift in BB we get  
 









  (11) 
 














  (12) 
 
A.3 To show that an increase in px/py is a sufficient condition for wS/wL to rise 
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  (13) 
Taking logs and differentiating and substituting Lx using equation (4), we get, 
ˆ ˆˆˆˆ ()()()[log(/)] SLxyx wwppLS abbab +-=-+-          (14) 
Since  ˆ b >0 and  log(/)0 x LS b -> , wS/wL will rise if px/py increases. 
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Table 1. Average Annual Wages (in 1994 Nuevos Soles)  
  1991  1994  1997  %1994-91 %1997-94 
Blue Collar  11490  11247  8712  -2.1  -22.5 
White Collar  16415  24899  24452  51.7  -1.8 





Table 2A. Wages and Employment in Manufacturing  
 
1991  1994  1997 
Share of manufacturing in total wage bill  0.24  0.32  0.25 
Share of manufacturing in GDP  0.32  0.36  0.35 
Share of manufacturing in total employment  0.28  0.33  0.27 
Share of manufacturing in blue collar employment  0.65  0.53  0.45 
Share of manufacturing in white collar employment  0.15  0.22  0.17 
Share of manufacturing in executive employment  0.21  0.30  0.26   28
 
Table 2B. Wages and Employment in Manufacturing (Man.) and Services (SS.)  
1991  1994  1997 
 
Man.  SS.  Man.  SS.  Man.  SS. 
Share in blue collar employment  0.65  0.34  0.53  0.45  0.45  0.53 
Share of blue collar workers in wage bill  0.45  0.11  0.33  0.09  0.27  0.08 
Blue collar average wage*  9882  14510  13349  8225  10743  6967 
Employment Ratios: 
Blue / White + Executive workers  1.58  0.15  1.16  0.31  1.04  0.31 
Wage Ratios: 
White / Blue collar workers  1.71  1.12  2.05  2.85  2.56  3.32 
Executive / Blue collar workers  6.09  3.34  6.88  10.59  13.92  18.38 
 
* in 1994 Nuevos Soles 
 
 
Table 3. Industries Showing Large Changes in Blue-Collar Wage Share* 
Industries showing increase in blue-collar wage share: 
Textiles, Footwear, Nonferrous Metallic Products. 
   
Industries showing decrease in blue-collar wage share: 
Fishmeal, Paper and Paper Products, Pharmaceutical Products, Other Chemical 
Products, Other Metal Products, General (Non-electrical) Machinery, Electrical 
Power and Water. 
 
* A change that is greater than 5 percentage points in absolute value is defined as “large”.   29
Table 4. Correlations of Some Key Variables* 
 




Blue collar wage share 
 
-0.27 








* All variables are expressed in changes. 
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Table 5. Mean Values of Key Variables  
  1994  1997 
Blue collar wage share  0.43  0.33 
Share of imported machinery in total intermediate goods  0.06  0.08 
White to blue collar wage ratio  1.6  1.9 
White to blue employment ratio  1.3  1.8 
Executive to blue collar wage ratio  5.6  8.9 
Share of firms with blue collar unions  0.39  0.26 
Share of firms with white collar unions  0.17  0.11 
Privatization (sales/value added)  0.04  0.16 
Imported machinery/total machinery investment  0.25  0.29 
Share of investment in total intermediate goods  0.22  0.26 
Share of imports in value added  2.60  3.41 
Share of exports in value added  1.28  2.06 
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Export share   
-0.006 
(0.02)   
-0.013 
(0.02)   
-0.35 







Import share   
0.04 
(0.07)   
-0.059 
(0.05)   
-0.94 




























Number of observations  79  79  79  79  82  82  82  82  82  82 
R square  0.290  0.302  0.239  0.278  0.285  0.336  0.273  0.313  0.117  0.120 
** and * denote significance at least at 5 and 10 percent levels.    32
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